NSA Director Allen testimony — SHAMROCK and MINARET, 1975

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES — THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1975

U.S. Senate,
Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater, Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the minority.

The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.

This morning, the committee begins public hearings on the National Security Agency or, as it is more commonly known, the NSA. Actually, the Agency's name is unknown to most Americans, either by its acronym or its full name. In contrast to the CIA, one has to search far and wide to find someone who has ever heard of the NSA. This is peculiar, because the National Security Agency is an immense installation. In its task of collecting intelligence by intercepting foreign communications, the NSA employs thousands of people and operates with an enormous budget. Its expansive computer facilities comprise some of the most complex and sophisticated electronic machinery in the world.

Just as the NSA is one of the largest and least known of the intelligence agencies, it is also the most reticent. While it sweeps in messages from around the world, it gives out precious little information about itself. Even the legal basis for the activities of NSA is different from other intelligence agencies. No statute establishes the NSA or defines the permissible scope of its responsibilities. Rather, Executive directives make up the sole "charter" for the Agency. Furthermore, these directives fail to define precisely what constitutes the "technical and intelligence information" which the NSA is authorized to collect. Since its establishment in 1952 as a part of the Defense Department, representatives of the NSA have never appeared before the Senate in a public hearing. Today we will bring the Agency from behind closed doors.

The committee has elected to hold public hearings on the NSA only after the most careful consideration. For 23 years this Agency has provided the President and the other intelligence services with communications intelligence vital to decisionmaking within our Government councils. The value of its work to our national security has been and will continue to be inestimate. We are determined not to impair the excellent contributions made by the NSA to the defense of our country.

We have a particular obligation to examine the NSA, in light of its tremendous potential for abuse. It has the capacity to monitor the private communications of American citizens without the use of a "bug" or "tap." The interception of international communications signals sent through the air is the job of NSA; and, thanks to modern technological developments, it does its job very well. The danger lies in the ability of the NSA to turn its awesome technology against domestic communications. Indeed, as our hearings into the Huston plan demonstrated, a previous administration and a former NSA Director favored using this potential against certain U.S. citizens for domestic intelligence purposes. While the Huston plan was never fully put into effect, our investigation has revealed that the NSA had in fact been intentionally monitoring the overseas communications of certain U.S. citizens long before the Huston plan was proposed — and continued to do so after it was revoked.

The discussions which will be held this morning are efforts to identify publicly certain activities undertaken by the NSA which are of questionable propriety and dubious legality.

General Allen, Director of the NSA, will provide for us today the background on these activities, and he will be questioned on their origins and objectives by the committee members. Like the CIA and the IRS, the NSA, too, had a "watch list" containing the names of U.S. citizens.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEW ALLEN, JR., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY BENSON BUFFHAM, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NSA; AND ROY BANNER, GENERAL COUNSEL, NSA

General Allen. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I recognize the important responsibility this committee has to investigate the intelligence operations of the U.S. Government and to determine the need for improvement by legislative or other means. For several months, involving many thousands of man-hours, the National Security Agency has, I believe, cooperated with this committee to provide a thorough information base, including data whose continued secrecy is most important to our Nation.

We are now here to discuss in open session certain aspects of an important and hitherto secret operation of the U.S. Government. I recognize that the committee is deeply concerned that we protect sensitive and fragile sources of information. I appreciate the care which this committee and staff have exercised to protect the sensitive data we have provided.

In the interest of clarity and perspective, I shall first review the purpose of the National Security Agency and the authorities under which it operates. Next, I will describe the process by which requirements for information are levied on NSA by other Government agencies. And finally, I will give a more specific description of an operation conducted in 1967-73 by NSA in response to external requirements, which I will refer to as "the watch list activity." This activity has been subject to an intensive review by this committee and staff in closed session.

Under the authority of the President, the Secretary of Defense has been delegated responsibility for both providing security of U.S. governmental communications and seeking intelligence from foreign electrical communications. Both functions are executed for the Secretary of Defense by the Director, National Security Agency, through a complex national system which includes the NSA as its nucleus.

The NSA works very hard at this task, and is composed of dedicated, patriotic citizens, civilian and military, most of whom have dedicated their professional careers to this important and rewarding job. They are justifiably proud of their service to their country and fully accept the fact that their continued remarkable efforts can be appreciated only by those few in Government who know of their great importance to the United States.

A particular aspect of NSA authorities which is pertinent to today's discussion relates to the definition of foreign communications. Neither the Presidential directive of 1952 nor the National Security Council directive No. 6 defines the term foreign communications. The NSA has always confined its activities to communications involving at least one foreign terminal. This interpretation is consistent with the definition of foreign communications in the Communications Act of 1934.

NSA does not now, and with an exception to be described, has not in the past conducted intercept operations for the purpose of obtaining the communications of U.S. citizens. However, it necessarily occurs that some circuits which are known to carry foreign communications necessary for foreign intelligence will also carry personal communications between U.S. citizens, one of whom is at a foreign location.

Now to the subject which the committee asked me to address in some detail — the so-called watch list activity of 1967 to 1973.

The use of lists of words, including individual names, subjects, locations, et cetera, has long been one of the methods used to sort out information of foreign intelligence value from that which is not of interest. In the past such lists have been referred to occasionally as watch lists, because the lists were used as an aid to watch for foreign activity of reportable intelligence interest. However, these lists generally did not contain names of U.S. citizens or organizations. The activity in question is one in which U.S. names were used systematically as a basis for selecting messages, including some between U.S. citizens, when one of the communicants was at a foreign location.

The origin of such activity is unclear. During the early sixties, requesting agencies had asked the NSA to look for reflections in international communications of certain U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba. Beginning in 1967, requesting agencies provided names of persons and organizations, some of whom were U.S. citizens, to the NSA in an effort to obtain information which was available in foreign communications as a by-product of our normal foreign intelligence mission.

The purpose of the lists varied, but all possessed a common thread in which the NSA was requested to review information available through our usual intercept sources. The initial purpose was to help determine the existence of foreign influence on specified activities of interest to agencies of the U.S. Government, with emphasis then on Presidential protection and on civil disturbances occurring throughout the Nation.

Later, because of other developments, such as widespread national concern over such criminal activity as drug trafficking and acts of terrorism, both domestic and international, the emphasis came to include these areas. Thus, during this period, 1967-73, requirements for which lists were developed in four basic areas: international drug trafficking; Presidential protection; acts of terrorism; and possible foreign support or influence on civil disturbances.

According to testimony by NSA Director General Lew Allen, U.S. government agencies nominated the names of individuals and organizations that appeared on the Watch List. To cover the Defense Intelligence Agency's requirements on possible foreign control of, or influence on, U.S. antiwar activity, DIA nominated the names of 20 U.S. persons who traveled to North Vietnam. The FBI submitted watch lists covering their requirements on foreign ties and support to certain U.S. persons and groups, with the lists including names of extremist persons and groups active in civil disturbances, and terrorists. The FBI lists included about 1,000 individuals. The Secret Service nominated about 180 U.S. individuals and groups that were potentially a threat to Secret Service protectees. During 1967-1973, all of the lists combined had a cumulative total of about 450 U.S. names on the narcotics list, and about 1,200 U.S. names on all other lists.

Senator Church and his colleagues did not object to Watch Lists of narcotics traffickers or to genuine threats to the president, but they wondered about the lack of adequate legal basis for some of this activity and what that leads to. Allen agreed that there was a problem and spoke of domestic intercepts which cannot be conducted under the President's constitutional authority for foreign intelligence, which meant that we are not authorized by law or constitutional authority and they are clearly prohibited. As General Allen explained, there were interpretations which deal with the right to privacy from unreasonable search and seizure of the Fourth Amendment. It was self-doubt that led the NSA to stop accepting Watch Lists with the names of U.S. citizens in the summer of 1973.

When Attorney General Elliot Richardson raised questions about the propriety of FBI and Secret Service requests for information from NSA, Allen officially closed down the program.

General Allen. During the period 1967-73, when U.S. names were on the watch list, NSA issued over 3,900 reports on U.S. persons. NSA's normal foreign intelligence reporting procedures were modified to protect the identities of U.S. persons to the extent possible. For example, the names of U.S. persons were sometimes omitted from reports or substituted with general descriptions. We tried to minimize the number of people who knew the identities of U.S. persons appearing in the reports. Nevertheless, we were clearly providing information about U.S. persons to other agencies of the Government.

Senator Church. General, was it the awareness that this was of questionable legality that led to the ultimate cancellation of the watch list activity?

General Allen. Yes sir. There was a growing awareness on the part of NSA that this activity was in a questionable area. The Director at the time, Admiral Gayler, was aware of the questionable nature of the activity. When the Attorney General made inquiry to us, we decided it was appropriate to stop the activity.

Senator Church. Now, General, we have another area to explore. I know you have been briefed on the fact that the committee intends to discuss it. I want you to know for the record that I consulted personally with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's Counsel, all of whom indicated they had no objection to the committee's proceeding as I intend to proceed now.

I am going to read a statement for the record. From 1947 to May of this year, the National Security Agency received copies of most international telegrams sent from the United States through the facilities of the major international telegraph companies. This was done through the direct cooperation of the companies involved. The program, known by the codeword SHAMROCK, was probably the largest governmental interception program affecting Americans ever undertaken. At its peak, NSA was processing 150,000 telegrams a month. In addition, certain telegraph messages identified as being of foreign intelligence value were also selected and routed to other agencies of the Government.

At the outset, the purpose apparently was only to extract international telegrams relating to certain foreign targets. Later the government began to extract the telegrams of certain U.S. citizens. The program, as I have described it, certainly appears to violate section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, as well as the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.

EXHIBIT NO. 3

July 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Sensitive SIGINT Operation

1. This memorandum establishes a SENSITIVE SIGINT OPERATION to be known as MINARET.

2. MINARET will involve the selective dissemination of information concerning U.S. individuals and groups who are targets of NSA SIGINT collection.

3. This operation covers individuals who have been involved in civil disturbances or who have been in contact with foreign elements who may be involved in or who have any connection with activities which are of interest to the U.S. intelligence community.

4. Reporting under MINARET will be made on a NODIS basis and reports will carry no NSA identification.

5. This operation is not to be discussed or revealed to anyone without the personal approval of the Director, NSA.

ATTACHED: MINARET CHARTER

The following categories are the basis for criteria for MINARET collection: Individuals or groups who are actively oppose U.S. policies concerning Southeast Asia. Individuals or groups who are in contact with foreign elements who may influence, instigate, or actually engage in such activities as riots, campus disorders, and other civil disturbances. Individuals or groups who are in contact with foreign elements and who: advocate destruction of property or violence as a solution to domestic problems; plan or participate in illegal demonstrations; plan to destroy, disrupt, or sabotage Federal and State facilities and activities; plan or actually engage in the sabotage of military equipment, facilities, or operations.

[NOTE: The MINARET charter as exhibited before the Committee had certain portions deleted to protect sensitive communications intelligence sources and methods.]