Operation Paperclip: Truman Library records
16 pages of White House and executive branch records on Operation Paperclip from the Harry S. Truman Library. Released via FOIA by The Black Vault. Two fax transmissions from the Truman Library dated April 21, 2009. The collection spans 1945 to 1950 and contains documents not available elsewhere in searchable form: the earliest White House proposal to import German scientists (December 1945), the Secretary of War's personal follow-up urging Truman to approve the Paperclip expansion (September 1946), and a 1950 warning about Russian recruitment of German scientists at the edge of the Soviet zone.
Back to Operation Paperclip overview →The Truman Library records are two separate fax transmissions received from the Harry S. Truman Library on April 21, 2009, in response to a FOIA request by The Black Vault. The first transmission is 6 pages. The second is 10 pages. Together they cover four distinct documents spanning 1945 to 1950.
The collection is notable for two reasons. First, it contains the earliest known White House-level proposal to import German scientists — a December 4, 1945 memorandum from Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace to President Truman, written before Paperclip had been formally expanded and proposing the importation of approximately 50 scientists by name. Second, it contains the October 1950 Bureau of Mines warning about Russian recruitment, which establishes that the U.S. government was still actively concerned about losing German scientists to the Soviet Union five years after the war ended.
The collection also includes the physical copy of the Truman approval — the same August 30, 1946 Acheson memorandum transcribed from the FRUS record on this site — along with Secretary of War Patterson's September 4, 1946 personal follow-up urging Truman to sign it. That Patterson memo is not in the FRUS record and appears only in this collection.
Harry S. Truman Library
500 West U.S. Highway 24, Independence, MO 64050-1798
Date: 4-21-09
Number of pages (including this page): 6
Original will not be sent.
From: Randy Sowell
Subject/Message: Paperclip Documents
December 28, 1950
Dear Oscar:
Your confidential memorandum of the twenty-first, enclosing a memorandum from the Chief of the Explosive Branch is most interesting. It seems to me that Mr. Lewis has something and we should take a look at it. These Russians have been taking over the German scientists and I think we ought to be careful that they don't get a corner on them.
I wish you would discuss the matter with the Senior staff of Central Intelligence and then after New Year's we will decide what we ought to do.
Sincerely yours,
Honorable Oscar L. Chapman
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D.C.
[Note: Envelope was marked personal.]
[Filed: PSF, General File "Sa-Sm"]
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON
December 21, 1950
Memorandum for the President.
Dr. James Boyd, Director, Bureau of Mines, has handed me the attached memorandum from one of his outstanding scientists who not long ago returned from Germany. His suggestion that we undertake a program for bringing to this country additional scientific talent from Germany seems to me to be worthy of thoughtful consideration.
Members of my staff have discussed the subject informally with Colonel Daniel E. Ellis on the Joint Intelligence Objectives Service who has been heading a program for bringing to this country as opportunities for work could be found for them outstanding scientists from the Western Zone of Germany. However, Colonel Ellis was inclined to think that the breadth of the program proposed in the attached memorandum to the Director of the Bureau of Mines, with its political and financial implications, cannot be undertaken at the present.
In any event, this matter is outside the scope of the work of this Department and I draw it to your attention solely with the thought that you may want to refer it to some appropriate unit for consideration and report.
Of course, Dr. Boyd and other members of my staff are available for discussion of this proposal at such time as they are called upon.
Dean
Secretary of the Interior Chapman
[Attachment]
[Declassification notation: E.O. 12, Sec. 3. Interior Dept. State Dept. Guidelines. By DES, NLT 7-67.]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF MINES
4800 FORBES STREET
PITTSBURGH 13, PENNSYLVANIA
October 16, 1950
Memorandum
To: The Director
From: Chief, Explosives Branch
Subject: Critical situation regarding scientists in Germany
During my recent scientific mission to Germany, I became aware of a serious situation relative to German scientists which I am bringing to your attention as I consider it to be of vital importance to the national defense.
Berlin and Gottingen have become centers of scientific research where eminent scientists and their assistants have been assembled. Both places are on the edge of the Russian Zone. Russian propaganda has been filtering through to the scientists in an unobtrusive manner, setting forth advantages of conducting scientific research on the Russian side, namely, the many great research institutions, unlimited equipment and scientific aides, and good housing, food, and clothing for the scientists and their families. All of these are drawing cards as the German scientist, in many instances, apparently does not mind on what side of the line he works, as long as adequate facilities are available for carrying out uninterrupted research in his chosen field and the living conditions are good. Conversations revealed the nature of the threat, namely that when ready the Russians would "invite" them and transport them and their families into the Russian Zone. The will to resist would be broken down by subtle propaganda of the above type. A similar situation exists in other German research centers.
I talked with a number of the scientists, particularly Professor L. F. Bonhoeffer, Director Physical Chemistry Division of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, Berlin, and the Max Planck Institute, Gottingen, Professor Ivan N. Stranaki, Technical University of Berlin, Professor W. Jost, University of Marburg, and Professor H. O. Kneser, Physikalisch-Technische Anstalt, Braunschweig. All were fully aware of the situation. Professor Stranaki, who is situated in Berlin at the back door of the Russians, considers the situation alarming. An interview with Mr. K. H. Lauder, Chief of the British Scientific Research Branch in Gottingen, disclosed that he and his staff had been aware of this dangerous situation for some time.
It is felt that the loss of several hundred first class German scientists and their chief assistants to the Russians would be a disastrous blow to us. It would have the equivalent force of losing a similar number of our key scientists to the Russians.
It was determined by conversations with some scientists that they would view with favor invitations from universities and research institutions in this country to come here for a limited period (say, the duration of the emergency) to carry on their research. Professor Stranaki estimated that a large number would accept such invitations. Others, who might consider this move somewhat premature, would have to be apprised of the urgency of the matter. Although I do not know personally all of the scientists involved, I am gathering a list of the important ones and their research specialties.
The plan that is suggested is that for defense reasons, selected universities and research institutions throughout the United States be subsidized with funds and facilities, where required, to enable them to extend invitations to selected German scientists whose field of work is of interest to the institutions. The research work of each institution would be enormously benefited; students would receive inspiration by contact with other eminent scientists; the spirit of basic research and discovery in this country, as good as it is, would unquestionably be heightened; the scientists would be of material assistance to us in our own defense research program; and the Russians would be deprived of their talents.
Immediately following the war, several hundred German scientists and engineers were brought to this country under Air Force, Navy, and Army sponsorship to engage in research on rocket and jet propulsion problems. They were maintained in several large groups and, I believe, they were well integrated into the programs. A particular advantage of the above plan is that the scientists would be spread out over the United States where they could be integrated into our scientific society in very small groups. In this way a maximum of benefit would be had from their separate talents.
The cost of bringing 600 scientists and their chief assistants and families to this country, and establishing them in research centers with provision of facilities, is estimated at about $25,000,000 for the first year, and about $10,000,000 in each succeeding year. Upon termination of the emergency, they would be returned to their seats of learning in their native country. Since some of the scientists reside in the British Zone, cooperation with the British should be sought for absorbing part of this number in their universities. I believe that cooperation of American universities in this program could be expected.
The benefits to the United States are incalculable, and it is hoped that serious consideration can be given to this plan.
Bernard Lewis
[Filed: PSF, General File "Sa-Sm"]
Harry S. Truman Library
500 West U.S. Highway 24, Independence, MO 64050-1798
Date: 4-21-09
Number of pages (including this page): 10
Original will not be sent.
From: Randy Sowell
Subject/Message: Paperclip Documents
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON 25
December 4, 1945
MEMORANDUM TO: Honorable Harry S. Truman
FROM: Secretary of Commerce
SUBJECT: Proposed Importation of German Scientists for U.S. Science and Industry Benefit.
The transfer of outstanding German scientists to this country for the advancement of our science and industry seems wise and logical. It is well known that there are presently under U.S. control eminent scientists whose contributions, if added to our own, would advance the frontiers of scientific knowledge for national benefit.
We are informed that our allies consider the employment of such men to be desirable and that many of the better German scientists have been transported to Russia and Britain where their past and future knowledge will be incorporated in the scientific endeavors of those nations. In recent weeks the movement of German scientific personnel from American control to zones under control of our Allies, especially the U.S.S.R., has increased markedly. Two Nobel prize winners are among this group: Dr. Hertz, Director of the Research Laboratory of Siemens and Halske and a world renowned physicist, and Professor Warburg, recipient of the Nobel award in medicine and physiology in 1931. It is evident that many of the outstanding German scientists will no longer be available unless a decision is made quickly to permit their importation to this country.
TYPICAL GERMAN SCIENTISTS NOW AVAILABLE
It is contemplated that any importations to this country would be restricted to scientists of outstanding attainments who can make a positive contribution to our scientific and industrial efforts.
Examples of the calibre of men referred to and available are:
Dr. W. J. Reppe — Director of Research, I. G. Farbenindustrie. Leader in the newly expanded field of acetylene chemistry. His knowledge in this field should be a great asset to U.S. industrial research. The American Chemical Society and leading chemical firms have attested the need for and value of Dr. Reppe's services.
Hellmuth Hertz — Member of the famous Hertz family. An exceedingly promising young scientist, trained in nuclear physics and already requested by the University of Chicago for their newly founded Institute for Nuclear Research.
Dr. Georg Jaags — An eminent physicist, specially expert in optics, who taught at the Universities of Jena and Gottingen and left teaching for a position with Zeiss Optical Works. A world famous physicist who could make a real contribution to the furthering of optical factories in this country.
Dr. O. Graff — A universally respected expert on concrete and road construction. Graff is responsible for the "autobahns" in Germany and should be able to assist in our peace-time road program.
Dr. Otto Hahn — Former Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut fur Chemie. A world famous chemist in the field of radio active chemistry. In 1939 he discovered the fission process of uranium on which the atomic bomb development is based. He has just received the Nobel prize.
POLICY DECLARATION REQUIRED
If you agree that the importation of a selected few (approximately 50 in number) would be an asset to our economy I suggest that you declare this to be U.S. policy. Subsequent to such a declaration, the State Department, which controls reparations, the Labor Department, concerned with immigration affairs, and the Publication Board, created by you to insure the dissemination of scientific knowledge, can work out practical methods for bringing such men to this country. The guiding principles followed in devising such methods might well be:
(a) Only scientists of proven ability with positive value to U.S. science and industry will be selected.
(b) A careful screening to insure against the importation of any one harboring anti-democratic principles will be essential.
(c) The men should be brought here willingly under an honorable and fair plan for their disposition. This plan should also insure that their knowledge and the results of their research in this country are made fully and freely available to all.
A positive program along the lines described is essentially "intellectual reparations" and may well be the most practical and enduring national asset we can obtain from the prostrate German nation.
Wallace
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
September 4, 1946
Memorandum for The President:
It is my understanding that Mr. Acheson sent you a memorandum dated August 30, on the subject, "Interim Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in the United States", recommending approval of the policy decided on by State, War and Navy.
I believe that it would be most advantageous to have the policy approved. Approval will be of benefit in two ways: first, in negotiating extensions for German and Austrian specialists already in the United States, the fact being that some of these contracts expire this month and we are having no success in negotiating extensions in the absence of an approved policy; and second, further procurement of these specialists from Europe for utilization in this country will be greatly impeded unless prompt action can be taken. For these reasons, I hope that you can see your way clear to advise the State Department of your approval.
Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of War
[Physical copy of the Acheson memorandum dated August 30, 1946 as held in the Truman Library. This is the same document transcribed from the FRUS record on this site. The Truman Library copy bears the approval notation.]
Declassification notation: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(D) or (E). Department of State guidelines, August 9, 1973.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Interim Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in the United States
I am presenting for your approval a statement of United States policy on the interim exploitation of selected German and Austrian specialists in the United States.
Since shortly after V-E Day, the War Department has operated a project known as "Paperclip" under which selected German scientists have been brought to this country under military custody for short-term exploitation. There remains in our zones of Germany and Austria a number of specialists whose knowledge and ability could be used to further our technology. General McNarney has reported that the services of many of these specialists may be lost to us unless steps are taken quickly to assure exploitation under favorable circumstances.
The statement provides for expanding "Paperclip" to include a total of between 800 and 1000 specialists. Since cooperation of the specialists is necessary to successful exploitation, provision is made for bringing members of specialists' families to this country, and for relaxing the formerly strict custody arrangements. The War Department would be responsible for custody and for excluding from the program persons with Nazi or militaristic records.
It is contemplated that at a later date selected persons would be granted regular status under the immigration laws.
This statement is based on recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and has been approved by the State, War and Navy Departments. I recommend your approval.
Dean Acheson
[Truman Library copy approval notation: "approved 9/3/46 Harry S. Truman" — Acting Secretary to Acheson]
[The Truman Library copy of the Appendix B policy enclosure, SWNCC 257/22. This is the same text transcribed from the FRUS record on this site. The Truman Library copy bears declassification notation referencing E.O. 11652.]
TOP SECRET
1. It is the policy of this Government (SWNCC 257/5) to exploit selected German and Austrian specialists in science and technology in the United States.
2. To insure that the time required for normal processing of immigration papers does not delay evacuation of specialists and families to the United States so as to render present policy ineffective and thereby endanger the national security, the War Department Paperclip Project will be expanded as follows:
a. Those specialists selected by the War and Navy Departments, plus nominations by the Commerce Department for exploitation under civilian auspices will be consolidated, coordinated with the British, and certified by a designated agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (now JIOA) as the "U.S. Exploitation List of German and Austrian Specialists in Science and Technology". The War Department will instruct the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the European Theater to arrange the execution of contracts by specialists and their evacuation to the United States in the following manner:
(1) The specialists so brought to the United States, exclusive of families, will not exceed 1000 in number at any time.
(2) The War Department will be responsible for moving families of specialists already in the United States, additional specialists, and their families, as rapidly as transportation from the Theater and housing in the United States can be made available. Normally families will not be evacuated with specialists concerned, but in the order of the length of time the specialist has been under exploitation and observation in the U.S.
(3) The contracts to be arranged with specialists by the Commanding General, USFET, will be so drafted as to ensure suitable salary and working conditions for the specialists without obligating the War or Navy Departments beyond the legal limitations of their respective appropriations.
(4) Contracts will provide return to Germany or Austria for those specialists and members of their families in cases of specialists not found qualified for extensive exploitation or of individuals not found acceptable by the United States for permanent residence in this country.
(5) Persons proposed to be brought to the U.S. hereunder shall be screened by the Commanding General, USFET, on the basis of available records. No person found by the Commanding General, USFET, to have been a member of the Nazi Party and more than a nominal participant in its activities, or an active supporter of Nazism or militarism shall be brought to the U.S. hereunder. However, neither position nor honors awarded a specialist under the Nazi Regime solely on account of his scientific or technical ability will in themselves be considered sufficient to disqualify a specialist for evacuation to the U.S. hereunder. Where there is doubt as to qualification of a specialist under the preceding sentence, the Commanding General, USFET, may transport the specialist to the U.S., where further interrogation and screening shall be conducted immediately in order to determine such qualification.
(6) All specialists and families brought to the United States will be under temporary, limited military custody until such time as visas are granted or repatriation is accomplished. The degree of surveillance over any specialist will depend upon the length of time he has been under observation and exploitation in the United States, and the trustworthiness he has demonstrated under interrogation, screening and subsequent observation.
(7) The War Department will formulate, in coordination with the Navy Department, the security and administrative procedure necessary to protect the national interests during the temporary limited military custody of these specialists and their families, and yet to insure the maximum exploitation of all these specialists by military and civilian agencies.
b. Specialists and their families brought to the United States hereunder will remain under temporary, limited military custody until visas are granted or repatriation is accomplished.
(1) Upon arrival of specialists or families in the United States, the War Department will screen, and cause to be prepared complete biographical and professional data on all such persons, copies to be supplied to the FBI, JIOA, and the technical service of the War or Navy Departments, whichever is the sponsoring agency.
(2) Through interrogation, investigation and surveillance by the Technical Services of the Army, the Army Air Forces and the Navy, with the assistance of the Commanding General, USFET, the War Department will cause the best information available concerning these specialists and their families to be assembled for consideration by the Justice and State Departments in connection with implementation of SWNCC 257/5.
(3) At the time request is made for the issuance of a visa, or for the return to Germany or Austria, of any specialist or his family, a copy of all additional security interrogation, investigation and surveillance papers will be forwarded to the FBI through JIOA by the sponsoring agency of the War or Navy Departments.
[SWNCC 257/22 — Appendix "B" — TOP SECRET]
The Truman Library records contribute three facts not established by the other Paperclip documents on this site.
First, the Wallace memo of December 4, 1945 establishes that the proposal to import German scientists reached the President's desk before the formal Paperclip expansion policy was written. Wallace named specific scientists, including Otto Hahn, and framed the program explicitly as "intellectual reparations." He proposed a screening standard — no one harboring anti-democratic principles — that was weaker than the standard eventually written into the Truman authorization. This memo predates the Acheson memorandum by nine months.
Second, the Patterson memo of September 4, 1946 establishes that Secretary of War Patterson personally followed up on the Acheson memo four days after it was sent. Patterson's memo is more urgent in tone than Acheson's. He states that contracts for scientists already in the United States were expiring that month and could not be renewed without an approved policy. Truman approved the Acheson memo on September 3 — the day before Patterson's follow-up arrived. The follow-up was unnecessary but confirms the War Department's institutional pressure behind the approval.
Third, the 1950 Bureau of Mines memo from Bernard Lewis establishes that five years after the war, U.S. government officials were still in Germany meeting with scientists, assessing the Soviet recruitment threat, and proposing new programs to bring German scientists to the United States. Lewis names specific scientists and research centers at risk and estimates the cost of a new recruitment program at $25 million in the first year. Colonel Daniel E. Ellis, the JIOA Director who appears in the CIA files on this site, is mentioned by name as being skeptical that the full program could be undertaken at that time.
Document: Operation Paperclip records from the Harry S. Truman Library. 16 pages. Two fax transmissions dated April 21, 2009. Released via FOIA request by The Black Vault (John Greenewald Jr.).
Repository: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, 500 West U.S. Highway 24, Independence, MO 64050-1798.
The Interference begins with a patent. US3951134, filed in 1974, describes a device for remotely monitoring and altering human brain waves without physical contact. The patent is real. The USPTO granted it.
What precedes that patent is a documented institutional record. In 1960, the CIA funded MKUltra Subproject 119 at Texas Christian University. The stated objective included techniques of activation of the human organism by remote electronic means. The contractor was unwitting. The budget was $6,370. Sidney Gottlieb signed off. In 1952, an ARTICHOKE field team produced total amnesia in two overseas subjects held in a guarded safehouse with eyes taped shut in transit. Their dispositions after the operation were outside the team's responsibility. In 1963, the CIA Inspector General recommended termination of unwitting testing on American citizens. The program ran for another decade. In 1983, a U.S. Army Intelligence report filed in the CIA's STARGATE collection treated the brain as an electromagnetic organ that could be entrained to external frequencies. Not as theory. As established fact.
The Colonial Authority in The Interference is what that timeline produces if you follow it forward rather than stop at the declassified record. The mesh program James Harlan carries inside his skull is built on the physics in these documents. The fiction begins exactly where the public record stops answering questions.