Report of Inspection of MKULTRA/TSD
This is the CIA's own internal review of MKUltra, written ten years into the program and four years before it was formally terminated. Inspector General J.S. Earman submitted it to the Director of Central Intelligence on July 26, 1963. He had it prepared in one copy only, which is stated on the cover memorandum. That single-copy instruction is itself significant: it tells you how the program was managed throughout its existence.
The report is the most candid internal government document produced about MKUltra while it was still running. It identifies four specific problems the Inspector General considered dangerous. Research in manipulating human behavior is considered by many professionals to be unethical, placing the reputations of participants in jeopardy. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality. A final phase of testing MKULTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public opinion.
The report documents that by 1963 only two individuals in the Technical Services Division had full substantive knowledge of the program, and most of that knowledge was unrecorded. Files were notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative statements. The program management relied primarily on oral communication.
The most significant finding concerns the covert testing program. Since 1955 the CIA had been administering MKULTRA substances to unwitting U.S. citizens through an informal arrangement with officials of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The arrangement funded two safehouses — one in San Francisco, one in New York — at $10,000 per year each. Test subjects included informers, members of criminal organizations, and individuals at all social levels, described explicitly as high and low, native American and foreign. The Inspector General found no effective cover story existed for this program, that present practice was to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs, and that the senior command of CIA lacked adequate protection against the high risks involved. He recommended termination.
The report also reveals that TSD had initiated 144 subprojects relating to the control of human behavior during the program's ten years of operation, with 25 remaining active at the time of the inspection.
Tab A attached to this report is the original April 3, 1953 Richard Helms memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence proposing the program, the Tab A description of Project MKULTRA, and the April 13, 1953 Allen Dulles memorandum approving it. These are the founding documents of MKUltra. Tab B is the MKDELTA Materials instruction governing operational use of behavioral control substances in clandestine operations. Tab C is the MKULTRA funding record for FY 1960-1963, showing annual program expenditures.
TOP SECRET — Copy 1 of 1
26 July 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of MKULTRA
1. In connection with our survey of Technical Services Division, DD/P, it was deemed advisable to prepare the report of the MKULTRA program in one copy only, in view of its unusual sensitivity.
2. This report is forwarded herewith.
3. The MKULTRA activity is concerned with the research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior. The end products of such research are subject to very strict controls including a requirement for the personal approval of the Deputy Director/Plans for any operational use made of these end products.
4. The cryptonym MKULTRA encompasses the R&D phase and a second cryptonym MKDELTA denotes the DD/P system for control of the operational employment of such materials. The provisions of the MKULTRA authority also cover [redacted b(1) b(3)]. The administration and control of this latter activity were found to be generally satisfactory and are discussed in greater detail in the main body of the report on TSD.
5. MKULTRA was authorized by the then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, in 1953. The TSD was assigned responsibility thereby to employ a portion of its budget, eventually set at 20%, for research in behavioral materials under purely internal and compartmented controls (further details are provided in paragraph 3 of the attached report). Normal procedures for project approval, funding, and accounting were waived. However, special arrangements for audit of expenditures have been evolved in subsequent years.
6. The scope of MKULTRA is comprehensive and ranges from the search for and procurement of botanical and chemical substances, through programs for their analysis in scientific laboratories, to progressive testing for effect on animals and human beings. The testing on individuals begins under laboratory conditions employing every safeguard and progresses gradually to more and more realistic operational simulations. The program requires and obtains the services of a number of highly specialized authorities in many fields of the natural sciences.
7. The concepts involved in manipulating human behavior are found by many people both within and outside the Agency to be distasteful and unethical. There is considerable evidence that opposition intelligence services are active and highly proficient in this field. The experience of TSD to date indicates that both the research and the employment of the materials are expensive and often unpredictable in results. Nevertheless, there have been major accomplishments both in research and operational employment.
8. The principal conclusions of the inspection are that the structure and operational controls over this activity need strengthening; improvements are needed in the administration of the research projects; and some of the testing of substances under simulated operational conditions was judged to involve excessive risk to the Agency.
9. Attached for the signature of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a memorandum transmitting the report to the Deputy Director/Plans requesting a summary of action taken or comments on the recommendations contained therein.
J.S. Earman, Inspector General
Attachments — as stated
1. Technical Services Division (TSD), (then Technical Support Staff), received authorization from the then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, on 3 April 1953 to develop and maintain continuing operational capabilities in the fields of a) [redacted b(1) b(3)] and b) chemical and biological materials capable of producing human behavioral and physiological changes, (see Tab A). The cryptonym MKULTRA was assigned to encompass TSD's research, development and equipment activities in these two fields. The cryptonym MKDELTA had already been assigned by DD/P Notice No. 220-1 on 20 October 1952 (since revised — see Tab B) as the indicator covering DD/P policy and procedure for the use of biochemicals in clandestine operations.
2. The MKULTRA charter provides only a brief presentation of the rationale of the authorized activities. The sensitive aspects of the program as it has evolved over the ensuing ten years are the following:
a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many authorities in medicine and related fields to be professionally unethical, therefore the reputations of professional participants in the MKULTRA program are on occasion in jeopardy.
b. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality implicit in the original charter.
c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy.
d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public opinion, as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services.
3. In recognition of the sensitivity of MKULTRA, TSD was authorized exclusive control of the administration, records, and financial accountings of the program. Simple statements of certification were all that were required of TSD to obtain advances of funds from Finance Division. The DCI's memorandum also exempted MKULTRA from audit, but this provision was modified to permit limited audit before the end of the first year. Funding of MKULTRA was eventually stabilized at 20 percent of TSD's annual research and development budget. It has fallen in the neighborhood of [redacted b(3)] per year over the ten-year history of the program, of which about 30 percent has been allocated to support of the [redacted b(1) b(3)]. See Tab C for MKULTRA funding record FY 60-63.
4. The inspection of TSD activities in the field of [redacted b(1) b(3)] while chartered under MKULTRA is discussed for reasons noted below in the section of the Inspector General's Survey dealing with the [redacted] of TSD, cf. discussions beginning with paragraphs [redacted]. The security considerations applying to [redacted] were found to be significantly different from those governing manipulation of human behavior. a) Many [redacted] external projects in support of the [redacted] are being funded and managed securely outside the MKULTRA mechanism. b) Chief, Support, TSD, believes that it may also be possible in the future to fund [redacted] MKULTRA projects by secure methods more compatible with DD/S responsibilities. c) The very nature of the [redacted] requires that a high percentage of its staff contribute and be witting of each operation. [redacted] security practices are tight and the Inspector General's survey recommends further refinements in security procedures.
5. The inspection of MKULTRA projects in biochemical controls of human behavior raised questions in the following area of policy and management which are dealt with in the balance of this report:
a. Scope of the MKULTRA charter: (1) Over the ten-year life of the program many additional avenues to the control of human behavior have been designated by the TSD management as appropriate to investigation under the MKULTRA charter, including radiation, electro-shock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, graphology, harrassment substances, and paramilitary devices and materials. (2) Various projects do not appear to have been sufficiently sensitive to warrant waiver of normal Agency procedures for authorization and control. (3) Other secure channels for establishment and funding of Agency-sterile activities have been evolved over the past ten years by Deputy Director/Support (DD/S) and in some cases could reasonably be employed by TSD in lieu of MKULTRA procedures. In view of these developments there is substantial agreement among all parties concerned that redefinition of the scope of MKULTRA is now appropriate.
b. MKULTRA management policies: (1) The original charter documents specified that TSD maintain exacting control of MKULTRA activities. In so doing, however, TSD has pursued a philosophy of minimum documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some of the projects. Some files were found to present a reasonably complete record, including most sensitive matters, while others with parallel objectives contained little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records precluded use of routine inspection procedures and raised a variety of questions concerning management and fiscal controls. (2) Lack of records essential to inspection of MKULTRA moved to the forefront among issues as the present survey proceeded. Under normal circumstances the inspectors would have examined an inventory of discrediting, disabling, and lethal substances perfected or procured from whatever sources. The records on representative items would have been reviewed according to such standard criteria as: (a) How were the substance and its properties identified? (b) What researcher was selected to perform the research, and why? (c) When was the work begun, where, involving what costs, at what rate of progress, based on what tests? (d) What are the present capabilities and limitations of the substance for clandestine operations? (e) What further research is being conducted on this and related substances and how does this reflect existing TSD capabilities, operational requirements and budget factors? (3) MKULTRA records afforded no such approach to inspection. There are just two individuals in TSD who have full substantive knowledge of the program and most of that knowledge is unrecorded. Both are highly skilled, highly motivated, professionally competent individuals. Part of their competence lies in their command of intelligence tradecraft. In protecting the sensitive nature of the American intelligence capability to manipulate human behavior, they apply "need to know" doctrine to their professional associates and to their clerical assistants to a maximum degree. Confidence in their competence and discretion has been a vital feature of the management of MKULTRA.
c. Advanced testing of MKULTRA materials: It is the firm doctrine in TSD that testing of materials under accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations. TSD initiated a program for covert testing of materials on unwitting U.S. citizens in 1955. The present report reviews the rationale and risks attending this activity and recommends termination of such testing in the United States, cf. paragraphs 10-18 below.
6. The research and development of materials capable of producing behavioral or physiological change in humans is now performed within a highly elaborated and stabilized MKULTRA structure. The search for new materials; e.g., psilocybin from Mexican mushrooms, or a fungi occurring in agricultural crops, is conducted through standing arrangements with specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations who are authorities in the given field of investigation in their own right. Annual grants of funds are made under ostensible research foundation auspices to the specialists located in the public or quasi-public institutions. This approach conceals from the institution the interest of CIA and permits the recipient to proceed with his investigation, publish his findings (excluding intelligence implications), and account for his expenditures in a manner normal to his institution. A number of the grants have included funds for the construction and equipping of research facilities and for the employment of research assistants. Key individuals must qualify for top secret clearance and are made witting of Agency sponsorship. As a rule each specialist is managed unilaterally and is not witting of Agency support of parallel MKULTRA research in his field. The system in effect "buys a piece" of the specialist in order to enlist his aid in pursuing the intelligence implications of his research. His services typically include systematic search of the scientific literature, procurement of materials, their propagation, and the application of test dosages to animals and under some circumstances to volunteer human subjects. No quarrel is found with the rationale of this program to the extent that it fits the original MKULTRA charter. However, for inspection purposes, there were lacking records, year by year, of the progress of each project and the recorded judgments of the project monitors on operational benefits vis-a-vis costs.
7. The funding of sensitive MKULTRA projects by sterile grants in aid as noted in the preceding paragraph disclosed one of the principal controversial aspects of this program. The original charter of MKULTRA assumed that the sensitivity of activities would be sufficient to justify both a) special protection for the researcher; and b) compartmentation of MKULTRA knowledge within the Agency. On this basis the inherent safeguards of DD/S procedures were waived, the DD/S was not consulted in the design of the MKULTRA management system, and established Agency audit procedures were waived. In the subsequent administration of the program, however, TSD has found it feasible to contract for some of the research on MKULTRA objectives in accordance with prescribed DD/S procedures. The DD/S, in turn, has evolved various secure systems for the funding of sensitive activities. It appears feasible and appropriate, therefore, to propose that the DD/S be consulted during the re-chartering of MKULTRA in the design of an administrative system that does justice to his responsibilities as well as to the management and security requirements of TSD. The Inspector General accordingly has recommended at the end of this report that the DD/S be consulted in the re-design of the system; that the Chief, Support, TSD, be assigned responsibility for the day-to-day support of MKULTRA and that the latter constitute a bridge to the DD/S for monitoring the future evolution of the system.
8. The next phase of the MKULTRA program involves physicians, toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals and in prisons, who are provided the products and findings of the basic research projects and proceed with intensive testing on human subjects. These specialists are also recipients for testing purposes of the flow of new products from pharmaceutical laboratories. Materials and procedures with intelligence potential may be identified through this relationship. The testing programs are conducted under accepted scientific procedures including the use of control populations, the employment of placebos, and the detailed observation, measurement, recording, analysis, and publication of findings. Where health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants in the program.
9. A current development in the testing of new products is the tightening of controls over dosages and procedures by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Since MKULTRA files contained no documentation on this subject, it was not possible to appraise the significance of this development for MKULTRA objectives. However, interviews with the TSD officers concerned indicated that the new rules are affecting procedures and causing controversy in research hospitals and pharmaceutical houses. The TSD officers have close relationships with key individuals in many of the leading U.S. pharmaceutical houses and count on their continued close cooperation in obtaining materials and services deemed vital to U.S. intelligence.
10. The final phase of testing of MKULTRA materials involves their application to unwitting subjects in normal life settings. It was noted earlier that the capabilities of MKULTRA substances to produce disabling or discrediting effects or to increase the effectiveness of interrogation of hostile subjects cannot be established solely through testing on volunteer populations. Reaction and attribution patterns are clearly affected when the testing is conducted in an atmosphere of confidence under skilled medical supervision.
11. TSD, therefore, entered into an informal arrangement with certain cleared and witting individuals in the Bureau of Narcotics in 1955 which provided for the release of MKULTRA materials for such testing as those individuals deemed desirable and feasible. The initial arrangement obtained the services of a senior representative of the Bureau and one of his assistants on the West Coast. A parallel arrangement was established on the East Coast in 1961. The Director of the Bureau has been briefed on the activity, but the Deputy Chief, TSD, who has guided MKULTRA from its inception, is of the opinion that the former would disclaim all knowledge and responsibility in the event of compromise. The MKULTRA program director has, in fact, provided close supervision of the testing program from the beginning and makes periodic visits to the sites. The sum of $10,000 has been provided annually to each of the two projects to cover cost of cultivation of targets and of maintenance of a safehouse in each area for the observation of effects of substances on selected test individuals.
12. The particular advantage of these arrangements with the Bureau of Narcotics officials has been that test subjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting of narcotics control. Some subjects have been informers or members of suspect criminal elements from whom the Bureau has obtained results of operational value through the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the substances on individuals at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance and testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within these categories.
13. A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is the infeasibility of performing scientific observation of results. The Bureau agents are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect. In a number of instances, however, the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case, and the agent could only follow-up by guarded inquiry after the test subject's return to normal life. Possible sickness and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects of the testing.
14. The MKULTRA program officer stated that the objectives of covert testing concern the field of toxicology rather than medicine; further, that the program is not intended to harm test individuals, and that the medical consultation and assistance is obtained when appropriate through separate MKULTRA arrangements. The risk of compromise of the program through correct diagnosis of an illness by an unwitting medical specialist is regularly considered and is stated to be a governing factor in the decision to conduct the given test. The Bureau officials also maintain close working relations with local police authorities which could be utilized to protect the activity in critical situations.
15. There have been several discussions in the public press in recent months on the use of certain MKULTRA-type drugs to influence human behavior. Broadly speaking, these have argued that research knowledge of possible adverse effects of such substances on human beings is inadequate, that some applications have done serious harm, and that professional researchers in medicine and psychiatry are split on the ethics of performing such research. Increasing public attention to this subject is to be expected.
16. The final step in the research and development sequence is the delivery of MKULTRA materials into the MKDELTA control system governing their employment in clandestine operations. The subject is discussed further in the next section; however, it is appropriate here to note that the employment of MKDELTA materials remains an art rather than a scientific procedure. A significant number of variables in the target individual, including age, sex, weight, general health, social status, and personality structure, may account for widely varying and unpredictable reactions to a given drug in a given dosage.
17. The final stage of covert testing of materials on unwitting subjects is clearly the most sensitive aspect of MKULTRA. No effective cover story appears to be available. TSD officials state that responsibility for covert testing is transferred to the Bureau of Narcotics. Yet they also predict that the Chief of the Bureau would disclaim any knowledge of the activity. Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs. The principal responsibility for the propriety of such testing rests with the MKULTRA program director and the Deputy Chief of TSD. The handling of test subjects in the last analysis rests with the Narcotics agent working alone. Suppression of knowledge of critical results from the top TSD and CIA management is an inherent risk in these operations.
18. Final phase testing of MKULTRA substances or devices on unwitting subjects is recognized to be an activity of genuine importance in the development of some but not all MKULTRA products. Termination of such testing would have some, but an essentially indeterminate, effect on the development of operational capability in this field. Of more critical significance, however, is the risk of serious damage to the Agency in the event of compromise of the true nature of this activity. As now performed under Bureau of Narcotics auspices, non-Agency personnel are necessarily fully witting of the true nature and significance of their assignments, and of the sponsorship of CIA. Compromise of this information intentionally or unwittingly by these individuals at some time in the future is a hazard that cannot be ruled out. A test subject may on some occasion in the future correctly attribute the cause of his reaction and secure independent professional medical assistance in identifying the exact nature of the substance employed, and by whom. An extreme reaction to a test substance could lead to a Bureau request for cooperation from local authorities in suppressing information of the situation. This would in turn broaden the circle of individuals who possessed at least circumstantial evidence of the nature of the activity. Weighing possible benefits of such testing against the risks of compromise and of resulting damage to CIA has led the Inspector General to recommend termination of this phase of the MKULTRA program. Existing checks and balances on the working level management of such testing do not afford the senior command of CIA adequate protection against the high risks involved.
19. It does not follow that termination of covert testing of MKULTRA materials on unwitting U.S. citizens will bring the program to a halt. Some testing on foreign nationals has been occurring under the present arrangements. Various U.S. deep cover agents overseas would appear to be more favorably situated than the U.S. narcotics agents to perform realistic testing. Finally, the operational use of the substances clearly serves the testing function in view of the lack of predictability of human reactions.
20. The present Deputy Chief of TSD, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, in his then capacity of scientific advisor to the Deputy Director/Plans (DD/P), released a study (hereafter referred to as the Gottlieb report) on 21 April 1960, covering his six-month investigation of "Scientific and Technical Problems in Covert Action Operations." Appendix B of the report was entitled, "The Applicability of Special Chemicals and Biologicals to Clandestine Operations." The inspectors found this Appendix to be a carefully prepared and very useful treatment of the subject. The remaining paragraphs draw on the Gottlieb report, take account of developments since that date, and discuss management and funding aspects of MKULTRA.
21. The author opened his discussion with the question of what the operational returns had been from an eight-year program involving an investment of approximately [redacted b(3)]. He observed that the Clandestine Services had encouraged TSD on various occasions to develop and maintain the operational capability in special drugs and chemicals but that TSD had received little or no guidance in directing the work and that the Clandestine Services had up to that time shown little inclination to use the end products operationally. He indicated that there had been approximately 100 operations over the eight years employing harassment materials (not controlled under the MKDELTA regulation) and only nine operations employing disabling drugs, (NB: two-thirds of these involved the use of drugs in interrogations). No use of lethal substances was reported.
22. The factors accounting for the low rate of use of this capability were considered to be the following: a. the technical shortcomings of the drugs; b. the problem of testing in realistic pilot operations; c. limitations on the dissemination of pertinent information to operations officers; d. organizational and administrative restrictions on operations; e. negative attitudes toward the use of MKDELTA materials; f. problems in the training of case officers in this field; g. the risk of stimulating increased use of MKDELTA materials by opposition intelligence services.
23. Technical shortcomings of the drugs: As of 1960 no effective knockout pill, truth serum, aphrodisiac, or recruitment pill was known to exist. MKDELTA was described as inherently a high-risk, low-yield field of operations. Three years later the situation remains substantially unchanged, with the exception that real progress has been made in the use of drugs in support of interrogation. Ironically, however, the progress here has occurred in the development of a total psychological theory of interrogation, in which the use of drugs has been relegated to a support role. [redacted b(1) b(3)]
24. The problem of testing in realistic pilot operations: This subject has been discussed above, beginning with paragraph 10. It should also be noted that testing on operational targets overseas is considered by some operations officers to be quite impracticable. Unilateral operations are imperative which substantially complicates the delivery problem. The possibilities of unexpected or critical reactions in test subjects and of ensuing compromise of the activity make most senior command personnel unwilling to take the risks involved.
25. Limitations on the dissemination of pertinent information to case officers; organizational and administrative restrictions on operations: The present-day situation concerning both of these problem areas is improved over 1960. TSD now regularly briefs a variety of senior officers on its MKDELTA capability. Approval of the use of MKDELTA materials is now accomplished within the chain of command of the DD/P. The DD/P may consult, for example, with the Chief, Medical Staff, concerning medical risks involved in MKDELTA operations, but the latter surely would not expect to exercise final authority for the disapproval of operations.
26. TSD has found that TDY visits of MKULTRA officers to the field in support of specific operations increases the awareness of the MKDELTA capability and stimulates proposals for additional projects. Of equal significance, however, has been the TSD decision in 1961 to station in the [redacted b(1) b(3)] officer who is informed on MKDELTA matters. A second officer is scheduled to move PCS during the summer of 1963 to support [redacted] and adjacent stations. While the principal responsibility of these officers lies in the field [redacted b(1) b(3)], the arrangement has proved useful in the MKDELTA field — notably in interrogation — as well. It now appears that increased reliance can be placed on this approach to promoting responsible use of the MKDELTA capabilities.
27. Negative attitudes toward the use of MKDELTA materials; problems in the training of case officers in this field: The 1960 Gottlieb report observed that some case officers have basic moral objections to the concept of MKDELTA and therefore refuse to use the materials. Some senior officers were reported to believe that the proper employment of the capability required more sophistication than most case officers possessed and that there would be a tendency toward over-reliance on and misuse of drugs in lieu of perfecting classic espionage techniques. Finally, it was suggested that MKDELTA controls were so restrictive as to have generated a general defeatism among case officers concerning the chances of getting approval for use of materials in routine rather than extreme situations. These matters will be reviewed in future field inspections of DD/P area divisions. In the meanwhile, the stationing of qualified TSD consultants in the field and increasing operational experience will tend to develop over time a category of case officers who have acquired direct appreciation of the potential and limitations of the MKDELTA capability.
28. The risk of stimulating increased use of MKDELTA materials by opposition intelligence services: The Gottlieb report stated that opposition intelligence services are active in the MKDELTA field and recommended that the CI Staff of the DD/P conduct a systematic study of the evidence. This recommendation has not been implemented. It is a subject of increasing significance as new materials and techniques become available.
It is recommended that: Deputy Director/Plans instruct Chief, CI Staff, to perform a study of the evidence of use of MKDELTA materials by opposition intelligence services and recommend appropriate measures for training DD/P case officers to recognize and counter hostile activity in this area.
29. In summary, present evidence concerning the operational value of the MKDELTA capability would appear to confirm the principal judgments of the 1960 Gottlieb report. There is an extremely low rate of operational use of the controlled materials. On the other hand, significant progress has been achieved in the development of an interrogation theory employing chemical substances, and in providing competent guidance to the field in MKDELTA matters through TSD officers working overseas.
30. TSD has initiated 144 projects relating to the control of human behavior; i.e., [redacted b(1) b(3)] during the ten years of operation of the MKULTRA program. Twenty-five (25) of these projects remain in existence at the present time, while a number of others are in various stages of termination.
31. Active projects may be grouped under the following arbitrary headings. Many projects involve activity in two or more of the areas listed: a. basic research in materials and processes; b. procurement of research materials; c. testing of substances on animals and human beings; d. development of delivery techniques; e. projects in offensive/defensive BW, CW, and radiation; f. miscellaneous projects, e.g., (1) petroleum sabotage, (2) defoliants, (3) devices for remote measurement of physiological processes.
32. The current management of TSD has initiated a policy of directing the activities of MKULTRA and of the Behavioral Activities Branch towards operations and away from long-range research. Prior to this change in policy which occurred in 1962, MKULTRA sponsored a large number of projects in the fields of applied psychology, sociology, anthropology, and graphology. The present management is unlikely to return to these fields of research under the MKULTRA charter. The inspectors concluded that many of these projects were of insufficient sensitivity to justify waiver of normal Agency control procedures. It is recommended at the end of this report that projects falling outside the authorized scope of MKULTRA henceforth require the prior written approval of the DD/P to qualify for MKULTRA processing.
33. The TSD chain of command for administration of the MKULTRA program comprises the following: a. Chief, TSD providing overall management; b. Deputy Chief, TSD, (a trained scientist) providing top substantive guidance for the MKULTRA program; c. Assistant Chief, TSD, for Research and Development, contributing management but not substantive guidance; d. Chief Scientist (reporting to c., above), (a trained scientist), contributing substantive guidance in some areas and responsible for the technical administrative processes of MKULTRA. He is supported by a GS-12 budget officer; e. program manager for MKULTRA, also serves as Chief of Biology Branch, (a trained scientist); f. project monitors located in various branches of TSD and specialized in the subject fields of the specific projects for which they are assigned responsibility.
To date this chain of command has relied primarily on oral communication in the management of MKULTRA. Files are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative statements that might give perspective to management policies over time. A substantial portion of the MKULTRA record appears to rest in the memories of the principal officers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures. The senior officers in the MKULTRA chain of command who are not substantively qualified need better records to measure the validity of projects through time and to identify key areas in which to require detailed periodic briefings from working specialists.
34. It will be noted that the Chief of Support, TSD, does not participate in the MKULTRA administration. The predecessor of the present Chief of Support served in TSD throughout the life of the program until 1962 without ever being associated with its management. In his stead, the Chief Scientist and a GS-12 budget officer have provided administrative support. The Chief Scientist has set policy on the funding of MKULTRA projects in all respects including salaries, overhead rates, fees, material, equipment, facilities, travel, and the like. The support officer was only added in 1962 under pressure of critical audit findings. This use of the Chief Scientist in a field where Chief of Support possesses superior qualifications and facilities constitutes a misuse of talent. The proposed new charter for MKULTRA should take account of this anomaly and also provide that Chief of Support advise in the future on decisions to fund projects under the MKULTRA authority and thereby to waive the application of DD/S procedures.
It is recommended that: Deputy Director/Plans draft and submit for the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence a revision and re-confirmation of the authority granted him in 1953 (Tab A) to operate the MKULTRA program, incorporating the following provisions:
a. Deputy Director/Plans assign Chief, Technical Services Division, to operate MKULTRA as a program for research and development of chemical, biological, and radioactive materials, and of techniques for the employment of electro-shock, capable of producing human behavioral or physiological change. Subsequent changes in scope of MKULTRA shall require the written approval of the Deputy Director/Plans.
b. Deputy Director/Plans arrange with Deputy Director/Research for the coordination of research relating to MKULTRA objectives to control duplication of effort and to provide for exchange of information of new capabilities.
c. Chief, Technical Services Division, consistent with established policy, may negotiate for research in MKULTRA materials and techniques to be conducted by Deputy Director/Research and by other component offices of CIA. He shall consult regularly with the appropriate officers of such components to control duplication of effort.
d. Chief, Technical Services Division shall approve the addition of MKULTRA developed materials to the list of operationally available MKDELTA substances and keep the Deputy Director/Plans advised of such additions. (cf. Clandestine Services Instruction No. 220-10, MKDELTA MATERIALS, dated 22 July 1960 — Tab B — which governs the employment of behavioral control materials in clandestine operations.)
e. Deputy Director/Plans, jointly with the Deputy Director/Support, establish policy for the administration of support functions under MKULTRA. Such policy shall seek to limit to the maximum the waiver of established Agency support procedures for activities of unusual sensitivity.
f. Chief, Technical Services Division shall maintain exacting internal controls and records of all substantive and support matters within each MKULTRA project. Records shall include: (1) A plan of the research and development to be performed. (2) An administrative annex setting forth security, budget and accounting arrangements agreed to by the parties to the project. Chief of Support, TSD, shall then certify to the DD/S for each such project that this annex is in accord with the agreed DDS/DDP policy. Pursuant to this responsibility, Chief of Support, TSD, shall have right of unlimited access to the substantive and administrative records of MKULTRA. (3) An annual written review by the project monitor setting forth in reasonable detail the nature of the work performed, the prospects for results of eventual operational significance, and a recommendation for continuance or termination of the project.
g. Testing of MKULTRA materials and devices shall only be performed in accredited research institutions under accepted scientific procedures.
h. Chief, Technical Services Division, shall brief the Deputy Director/Plans at least semi-annually on MKULTRA activities. The Deputy Director/Plans after each briefing shall promptly notify the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence that he has personally conducted a semi-annual review of the program.
i. The MKULTRA program be audited in accordance with the provisions of HR 31-1, including auditor access to substantive as well as administrative records.
TOP SECRET — Security Information — T.S. 87624 — Copy 1 of 5 copies
3 April 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Two Extremely Sensitive Research Programs
1. Approximately 6% of the TSS research and development effort lies in two highly sensitive fields in which it is not possible to conduct the work through the customary contracts for security reasons and other considerations.
2. These two sensitive fields are: a) Covert studies of biological and chemical warfare; b) [redacted b(1) b(3)].
3. Permission of the DCI is requested to handle work in these two fields in the manner outlined in Tab A without contracts and with reimbursement to be made against invoices properly certified by TSS.
4. All controls established in the PRC approval of the original Research Program (other than signing of a contract) would remain unchanged. Periodic financial and progress reports will be made. All documents will be retained by TSS.
5. No new funds are involved. This procedure would apply to funds previously approved for research.
6. Tab B is a memorandum to the Deputy Director (Administration) for your signature authorizing this procedure.
Richard Helms, Acting Deputy Director (Plans)
Attachments: (2) — Tab A: Description of Project MKULTRA and the controls which will be exercised over its execution. Tab B: Suggested Memorandum from DCI to DD/A authorizing payment of invoices under Project MKULTRA.
Distribution: Addressee — Orig and 1 w/attachments. DD/P — 1 w/attachments. TSS/OC — 1 w/attachments. Exec. Reg. — 1/attachments.
TOP SECRET — Security Information — T.S. 87624 — Copy 1 of 5 copies
1. On 6 June 1952, the Project Review Committee approved the TSS Research Program for Fiscal Year 1953.
2. The PRC approval authorized the Director of Research, at his discretion and with the approval of the Research Chairman, to apportion and obligate the research funds among individual projects, such projects to be subject to the usual Agency procedures and administrative controls.
3. This Research Program has been actively underway since the middle of 1952 and has gathered considerable momentum during the past few months. It is now evident on the basis of work currently underway that approximately 94% of the projects contemplated can be handled through regular procurement channels by means of the customary contracts signed jointly by the Agency and the organization undertaking to carry out the work. It has also become apparent that approximately 6% of the projects are of such an ultra-sensitive nature that they cannot and should not be handled by means of contracts which would associate CIA or the Government with the work in question. This 6% of the current research effort now lies entirely within two well-defined fields of endeavor, namely:
(a) Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemical materials. This area involves the production of various physiological conditions which could support present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offensive potential, the development of a comprehensive capability in this field of covert chemical and biological warfare gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential, thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the use of these techniques as we are. For example: we intend to investigate the development of a chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state, the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predicted for each individual. This material could potentially aid in discrediting individuals, eliciting information, implanting suggestion and other forms of mental control.
(b) Research and engineering development in the field of [redacted b(1) b(3)].
4. It is highly undesirable from a policy and security point of view that contracts should be signed indicating Agency or Government interest in either of these two fields. In a great many instances the work in field (a) must be conducted by individuals who are not and should not be aware of our interest. In all cases dealing with field (b), it is mandatory that any connection with the Agency should be known only to an absolute minimum number of people who have been specifically cleared for this purpose. In no case should any manufacturer or supplier be aware of Government interest.
5. In many cases in field (a) where the researcher can be cleared and may be aware of our interest in the program, he is unwilling to have his name on a contract which remains out of his control in our files. Experience has shown that qualified, competent individuals in the field of pharmacological, physiological, psychiatric and other biological sciences are most reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputations.
6. Even internally in CIA, as few individuals as possible should be aware of our interest in these fields and of the identity of those who are working for us. At present this results in ridiculous contracts, often with cut-outs, which do not spell out the scope or intent of the work and which contain terms which the cut-out cannot incorporate in his contract with the researcher without revealing Government interest. Complete Government audits of such contracts are impossible for the same reason.
7. It is therefore, requested that the DCI authorize TSS to handle 6% of the previously approved research budget for FY '53 without the establishment of formal contractual relations. This program will be known as Project MKULTRA.
10. The establishment and approval of Project MKULTRA will allow TSS to undertake highly desirable and necessary research in these two sensitive fields which would not be possible unless the work can be handled in this manner.
SECRET — Security Information — Central Intelligence Agency, Washington 25, D.C. — Office of the Director — APR 13 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Administration)
SUBJECT: Project MKULTRA — Extremely Sensitive Research and Development Program
1. On 6 June 1952, the Project Review Committee approved the DD/P/TSS Research Program for Fiscal Year 1953.
2. The PRC approval authorized the Director of Research, at his discretion and with the approval of the Research Chairman, to obligate the research funds and apportion them among individual projects, such projects to be subject to the usual Agency procedures and administrative controls.
3. A small part of the Research Program contemplated by TSS and discussed with me consists of ultra-sensitive work. The nature of the research and the security considerations involved preclude handling the projects by means of the usual contractual agreements.
4. I have, therefore, approved the obligation and expenditure by TSS of 6% of the total budget already approved by the PRC for research for FY '53 without the signing of the usual contracts or other written agreements.
5. This 6% will be handled as Project MKULTRA. Would you please make the necessary arrangements so that invoices forwarded by TSS applying to MKULTRA will be paid, provided that: a) in the aggregate, they do not exceed 6% for FY '53 without further authorization from me; b) each invoice is to bear a certification by the Chief, DD/P/TSS, as the Research Director, that the invoice applies to Project MKULTRA and that the conditions outlined in the DD/P memorandum for DCI dated 3 April have been complied with. The certification will also request that payment be made; c) the invoice shall bear the certification of the Executive Secretary of the Research Board that the scope of the program has been approved; d) the invoice shall bear the certification of the cognizant TSS Division Chief that the work has been satisfactorily performed from a technical point of view and has been carried out in accordance with the understandings reached between TSS and the individual or concern doing the work.
6. No further documents will be required to justify payment of the invoices. Exacting control will be maintained over the Project by TSS.
7. Other provisions and control over the Research Program specified in the original PRC approval remain unaltered. The monthly budget and financial record being submitted by TSS to DD/A will include financial information on the work being conducted under Project MKULTRA, showing how much of the 6% has been committed, how much has been spent, and how much remains.
ALLEN W. DULLES, Director, Central Intelligence
Distribution: Addressee — Orig. and 1. DD/P — 1. TSS/OC — 1. Exec. Registry — 1.
SECRET — Technical Support — 22 July 1960
MKDELTA MATERIALS — Rescission: [redacted b(3)] 20 October 1952
1. GENERAL: a. MKDELTA materials are certain chemical and biological materials (including K and L tablets) capable of producing human behavioral or physiological changes. Such materials may be obtained only in accordance with the provisions of this instruction. b. The provisions of the instruction are not intended to cover those materials commonly known as harassment materials.
2. POLICY: a. The use of MKDELTA materials will be limited to situations in the exercise of official duties which clearly justify such use. b. Their issuance will be strictly controlled and will require in each instance the written approval of the Deputy Director (Plans). c. MKDELTA materials not used for the purpose for which they were issued will be promptly returned to TSD; on-the-shelf storage against possible future needs will not be permitted.
3. PROCEDURES: a. Informal discussion of the requirement to determine its technical feasibility will be held with TSD before preparation of any formal request or any coordination with other elements. b. Requests for the issuance of these materials will be prepared in memorandum form for the signature of the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Operating Division or Staff concerned. No other signature is authorized. c. This memorandum will be routed first to any other division(s) or staff(s) whose coordination is necessary, then to the Chief, TSD, who will append his comments and return it to the originator for transmittal to the Deputy Director (Plans) for approval. Transmittal of the memorandum will be on an Eyes Only basis. d. Procedures used in the past that may have differed from the above will no longer be used.
4. RECORDS: The Chief, TSD, will maintain a record of all issuances, to include the date of issuance, the name and signature of the immediate recipient, and a reference to the approved memorandum request, which he will keep in a readily available supporting file.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR., Deputy Director (Plans)
The following is the MKULTRA funding record as reproduced in Tab C of the Inspector General's report. Dollar amounts for the MKULTRA column are partially redacted under b(3) in the declassified version. The Research Program totals and percentage figures are visible.
FY 1960 — Research Program: $9,225,798 — MKULTRA: $879,004 — 8.7% — Total: $10,104,802
FY 1961 — Research Program: $10,672,462 — MKULTRA: $930,601 — 8.0% — Total: $11,603,063
FY 1962 — Research Program: $10,470,109 — MKULTRA: [redacted b(1) b(3)] — 11.9% — Total: [redacted]$78,999
FY 1963* — Research Program: $7,495,273 — MKULTRA: [redacted] — 7.3% — Total: $8,087,687
* Through 8 May 1963.
Note: The MKULTRA funding column shows that the program consistently exceeded its nominal 6% budget authorization, running between 7.3% and 11.9% of the total TSD research and development budget across the period covered. The 20% figure cited in the cover memorandum referred to an earlier ceiling established in the original authorization.
Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General J.S. Earman. Report of Inspection of MKULTRA/TSD. July 26, 1963. Top Secret. One copy. CIA FOIA document number C06767515. Approved for release 2019/04/03.
Original source: CIA FOIA Reading Room — document C06767515 →
Archived copy: archive.is/OIL7W →
NOTE: This document was prepared in one copy only and filed separately from the MKULTRA operational records. This is why it survived the 1973 destruction order. It is the most complete surviving internal account of the program's structure and operations. The CIA Reading Room link above provides the original declassified PDF. The archive.is link provides a permanent archived copy.