Project ARTICHOKE — primary source documents

31 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project ARTICHOKE

ARTICHOKE is the Agency cryptonym for the study and/or use of "special" interrogation methods and techniques. These "special" interrogation methods have been known to include the use of drugs and chemicals, hypnosis, and "total isolation," a form of psychological harassment.

A review of available file information obtained from Office of Security resources failed to reflect a comprehensive or complete picture of the ARTICHOKE program as participated in by the Office of Security. Fragmentary information contained in a variety of files previously maintained by the Security Research Staff (SRS) reflected several basic papers which described, in general terms, the program known as ARTICHOKE. Information contained therein indicated that prior to 1952, the Office of Security had studied the use of drugs and chemicals in "unconventional interrogation." These studies were evidently coordinated with the Agency unit which was then called OSI. OSI at that time apparently was the coordinating unit within CIA.

One paper reflected that an Office of Security team as early as 1949-50 experimented with drugs and hypnosis under a project called BLUEBIRD. This paper also reflected that by 1951 actual interrogations utilizing drugs were conducted by a combined team of Office of Security and Office of Medical Services personnel, but few details were available.

File information indicated that in 1952, overall responsibility for Project ARTICHOKE passed from OSI to the Office of Security. References to operational use of drugs as an aid to interrogation since that time were found in various files, but few details concerning these experiments were reflected. A memorandum, subject title: Project ARTICHOKE, dated 21 November 1952, by Mr. Sheffield Edwards, reflected transfer of control of Project ARTICHOKE from OSI to the Office of Security. The memorandum indicated that I&SO (Office of Security) should call upon the research and support facilities of the CIA Medical Staff and the Office of Technical Services as required. Responsibility for the evaluation of foreign intelligence aspects of the project were to remain with OSI.

The unit within the Office of Security which apparently coordinated Project ARTICHOKE activities was SRS, with Mr. [redacted] for many years the focal point. Details of Office of Security involvement in individual Project ARTICHOKE operational utilizations were found in very few instances. A reference in an SRS log (1951-67) reflected, however, that SRS had been involved in the experimentation and use of hypnosis "from the start." In the same reference, it was stated that "SRS has examined and investigated numerous unusual techniques of interrogation including psychological, harassment and such matters as 'total isolation.'" The SRS log referred to above, which covered a period from 1951 to 1967, indicated that, as of 1967, "the term ARTICHOKE is not in general use now and drug interrogation is conducted from the recommendation of an Agency committee of which the Chief, SRS, is the Office of Security representative." No record was found which reflected when or if overall responsibility for Project ARTICHOKE was transferred from the Office of Security to any other Agency component.

One of the few areas where detailed information was available was concerned with hypnotic experimentations. A log of hypnotic experiments conducted by Office of Security personnel was reviewed. The log reflected that numerous (probably several hundred) experiments with hypnotism were conducted in Agency buildings, apparently utilizing the staff employee volunteers as subjects. In some instances, representatives from Agency components other than the Office of Security were present. The log reflected hypnotic experimentations during 1951, 1952, and 1953. It could not be determined from available file information when the hypnotic experiments actually began or were caused to be ceased. No record was located which reflected hypnosis utilized as an actual operational tool in the field. In connection with hypnotism, it appears that SRS utilized an Agency employee, one [redacted], as an informant in various societies dealing with hypnotism to keep abreast of current developments in the field.

Few references were found pertaining to the area of "total isolation" as an interrogation aid. A memorandum pertaining to this subject, dated 21 March 1955, was written by Mr. [redacted] of SRS to the Director of Security. The paper discussed "total isolation" techniques as an operational tool of potential. Another paper (a sterilized version, probably written by an element of the Department of Defense) dated 16 March 1955, reflected the results of "total isolation" experiments on six volunteers, all members of the U.S. military. No reference was found to any additional experiments in this field, nor was any reference found which reflected actual use of this technique in an operational situation.

As far as the experimentation and/or utilization of various drugs is concerned, references to a few instances were located, but little detail was available, and it was clear from the files that much of the detailed information probably was maintained by Agency units other than the Office of Security, i.e., the Office of Medical Services and the Office of Technical Services.

Among the instances where details were located in which drugs were used in an operational environment under the auspices of Project ARTICHOKE, were the following:

(a) In 1954 three subjects were interrogated by a Project ARTICHOKE team utilizing drugs of an unspecified nature. The three subjects were identified as [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted] in a memorandum dated 13 January 1955, with a cover sheet signed by Mr. [redacted]. The interrogations took place [redacted], and the memorandum mentioned injections of "solution #1" and "solution #2," but these drugs were not further identified. It was noted in the memorandum that the cases were handled "under straight drug techniques — hypnosis or narco-hypnosis was not attempted."

(b) A memorandum dated 20 January 1959 to Mr. [redacted] from [redacted] indicated that a field request had been made for a "P-1 interrogation." The writer identified a "P-1 interrogation" as one using LSD. Approval was granted on 27 January 1959 by the initials [redacted], presumably Mr. [redacted]. No further reference to the case could be found, thus no details were available.

(c) A series of cables between [redacted] and Headquarters in 1955 requested ARTICHOKE interrogations for nine persons. No disposition in this instance was found, however, a transmittal slip affixed to the materials dated in 1960 indicated that the ARTICHOKE interrogations probably did not actually take place in [redacted] at that time.

(d) A memo contained in the security file of [redacted] reflected that an ARTICHOKE team was dispatched to [redacted] in June 1952 to conduct ARTICHOKE interrogations on [redacted]. No further reference to this operation was noted, and no disposition could be found.

(e) In the case of [redacted], [redacted] operation in [redacted], drugs were utilized in the interrogation which took place [redacted]. Again, details of the operation were not available. However, an interview with the Office of Security representative who participated in the interrogation revealed that a form of LSD was used in this instance. In this case, approval was granted by Headquarters for the ARTICHOKE interrogation. A memorandum dated 6 July 1960, signed by Mr. [redacted], Deputy Director of Security, reflected that approval for use of drugs in this case was granted at a meeting of the Drug Committee on 1 July 1960 and cabled to [redacted].

As stated earlier, little detail was available in file information concerning the conduct of actual cases utilizing Project ARTICHOKE techniques. It appears obvious, however, that the few cases noted above were only a small part of the actual utilization of ARTICHOKE techniques in the field. For one thing, almost no information was available for the period prior to 1952, so that Project BLUEBIRD experiments and operations were not noted specifically. In addition, annual reports of accomplishments found in SRS log materials reflected a substantial amount of activity in the Project ARTICHOKE area. The review for 1953-1954 stated in part that SRS had "dispatched an ARTICHOKE team for permanent location in an overseas area." The review for 1954-1955 stated in part that SRS conducted numerous ARTICHOKE experiments and "prepared and dispatched an ARTICHOKE team to an overseas area to handle a number of sensitive cases."

Review of file materials consistently reflected that the Office of Security exercised caution in the utilization of drugs under the ARTICHOKE Program. Although it is apparent that SRS for a number of years was engaged with certain other Agency components in research and operational work with hallucinogenic drugs, the work was apparently conducted under strict controls. As previously stated, no information pertaining to when or if control of Project ARTICHOKE was transferred from the Office of Security to another Agency component was located. Apparently, SRS at one time maintained an inventory of ARTICHOKE materials which contained numerous drugs of all types including LSD-25. A memorandum dated 14 October 1957 requested authorization for SRS to transfer ARTICHOKE materials and apparatus to Dr. [redacted] of Medical Services. The memorandum was written by Mr. [redacted] and approval to transfer the materials was granted by Mr. [redacted] on 17 October 1957.

In the review of file information contained in SRS materials, one incident which occurred in November 1953 appears worthy of note. Although it was not clear from file information whether or not the incident occurred under the auspices of Project ARTICHOKE, the incident did involve use of LSD in an experimental exercise. One Frank OLSON, a civilian employee of the Department of the Army, committed suicide a week or so after having been administered LSD by an Agency representative. Details concerning this incident apparently will be reported in a separate memorandum, but it appears that the drug was administered to several unwitting subjects by a Dr. GOTTLIEB, at that time a branch chief in TSS (now OTS). A short time after the LSD was administered, the subjects were told that they had been given LSD. On the day following the experiment, OLSON began to behave in a peculiar and erratic manner and was later placed under the care of a psychiatrist. A few days later, OLSON crashed through a window in a New York hotel in an apparent suicide. A memorandum dated 1 December 1953 from the IG Staff caused the impoundment of all LSD materials. Information contained in the above mentioned files reflected that the drug had been administered without the prior knowledge or approval of the Office of Security or the Office of Medical Services.

It should be noted that the information contained herein is based on resources available within the Office of Security only, and no effort has been made to delve into files of other Agency units such as the Office of Medical Services or the Office of Technical Services. As the reader is by now acutely aware, insufficient information was available to provide a clear understanding of either Project BLUEBIRD or Project ARTICHOKE. Investigative efforts reflected that numerous files and collected data had been routinely purged or destroyed in the normal course of events at some time in the past.

A/B, III, 6, 4

26 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Project ARTICHOKE

1. On 20 August 1952 I received a long distance telephone call from [redacted]. He said that the work which he had started for [redacted] was nearing completion and that the final reports from two other of his men working in the same field were expected in two or three weeks. He said he felt it was quite important that someone concerned with the project come to [redacted] to discuss the progress with him and the other men before these final reports were submitted. He said that he could be reached by phone at [redacted].

2. On 22 August 1952 I phoned this information to [redacted], I&SO, who said he would look into the matter of who should be sent. He said that [redacted] is currently out of the country as are a number of those concerned with this project. He promised to phone me in a day or two.

[signed] Chief, Operations Staff

cc: Deputy Assistant Deputy (Admin) for Security

A/B, 2, 24/3

3 July 1952

TO: Security Officer

VIA: Deputy Security Officer

FROM: Chief, Technical Research Staff

SUBJECT: Artichoke Cases, June 1952 [redacted]

1. Between Wednesday, 4 June 1952, and Tuesday, 18 June 1952, the I&SO Artichoke Team conducted special interrogations near [redacted] on two operational cases. In the opinion of all team members, case officers and others directly or indirectly involved, the Artichoke operations were entirely successful. Details follow.

2. The I&SO Artichoke Team was composed of the following individuals: [redacted — names redacted under A, G exemptions] in charge of technical matters and I&SO Staff Officer; and the writer.

3. The Artichoke Team, during its stay [redacted], made several requests for all available cases that would benefit by Artichoke treatment. However, only two subjects, hereafter referred to as Case #1 and Case #2, were submitted and processed by the Artichoke technique. Case #1 was [redacted — names redacted under H/B/6, B/3 exemptions] and who had given our field officers a number of conflicting stories concerning his background, activities, and his work [redacted]. Case #2 was [redacted — names redacted under H/B/6 exemption] over to our overseas officers through the [redacted]. Neither of the above subjects spoke English. The first individual [redacted] was somewhat of a low-type intellectual, while the latter individual was considerably more intelligent and apparently had a more important intelligence background. Both were considered professional agent types and both were suspected of possible connections with [redacted].

4. Prior to departure of the Artichoke Team from the United States and in view of the extremely secret nature of the Artichoke work, [redacted] had been requested by dispatch from [redacted] to provide certain security measures in connection with the operation of the Artichoke techniques. In general, it may be said that owing to the continuous efforts of [redacted] and the support given him by [redacted], the security problems involved were handled most effectively. Details follow.

5. Because of the nature of the Artichoke work involving the use of chemicals, hypnosis, extremely complicated technical equipment, and because both subjects to be examined were individuals who could well be regarded as desperate (possible suicides), the security problem was very complex. In this connection, the Artichoke Team had requested an adequate safe house. Through the efforts of [redacted], the Artichoke work was performed at a safe house lying [redacted]. The house itself is quite large with adequate rooms for Artichoke operations and a very capable, though small, household staff to provide necessary meals and service for the guards, subjects, and the Artichoke Team as required. Two sets of guards were furnished, both on a full 24-hour basis. Stationed outside of the house was [redacted] if necessary. These guards were continuously on duty, one in front of the house where he could control the entrance gate to the estate and observe the front facade of the house and one stationed in the rear of the house where the rear approaches and rear facade of the house could be easily covered. These guards were procured through the efforts of [redacted]. They were regularly relieved and operated [redacted]. They ate some meals at the house but slept and were fed at [redacted] as a rule. Inside of the house and in plain clothes was another [redacted], also maintained on a 24-hour basis, which guarded the room of the subject and covered all of his movements such as eating, going to the toilet, washing, etc. at all times. These guards were armed but the weapons they carried were concealed. They slept, ate, and lived in the house. Their guard was posted, in general, at the head of the stairs to the second floor, immediately outside of the room in which the subject was confined. The subject's door was kept open at all times for observation purposes except when specifically ordered closed. The subject's room was barren except for basic essentials — bed, chair, etc. — to prevent possible suicide. The only window was heavily screened. The subject was always observed while eating, washing, or tending to bodily functions, etc. This guard detail was also arranged [redacted] and operated directly under the control of members of [redacted] staff. As stated above, these individuals also wore [redacted] but, at all times, remained in civilian clothes.

6. In addition to the security measures involving guards, the Artichoke Team had the responsibility of a considerable amount of valuable technical equipment and medical supplies that were used in the Artichoke operations. To control this properly, separate rooms were established for the technical work (recording operations) and all technical equipment, with certain exceptions, was kept under lock and key in this room. This room was continually under observation by the internal guards who were stationed approximately fifteen feet from the door of the room. There were no other inside entrances to the room. In addition, some of the medical supplies used were kept in the room assigned to the members of the Artichoke Team and were held there overnight during the times that some of the Artichoke Team members spent on the premises.

7. Another problem of a security nature was the fact that everything possible was done to prevent the subjects from learning the identity or names of individuals concerned in the Artichoke operations or, insofar as possible, preventing the subjects from seeing any individuals except those who had to deal personally and openly with the cases. This was handled by prior agreement among team members that no identifying names were to be given to any team members and that in addressing one another within the possible hearing of the subjects or certainly in front of the subjects, false names were continually used. Team members whose duty did not require them to be present before the subjects did everything in their power to keep the subjects from seeing them as they moved about the premises or engaged in the Artichoke operations.

8. Among the important security problems, which will be discussed in detail later and which are mentioned only briefly now for a matter of record, were the problems of disposal of the subjects after Artichoke treatment and the important questions as to whether or not amnesia had been obtained. In connection with Case #1, in the professional opinion of [redacted] and as far as the writer is able to determine, a total amnesia was produced. Disposal of Case #1 (which was not a problem of the Artichoke Team) was apparently to be handled as follows: Since the Artichoke technique had shown that, from an operational point of view the subject had no further value to the Agency, the subject was to be returned to [redacted] and after a period of time, removed from solitary and gradually permitted to mingle with larger and larger prison groups. Ultimately, and after a considerable lapse of time (perhaps as much as two years), the subject would be released. The Artichoke Team recommended some observation in this case with a later recheck on the amnesia, if possible.

9. In Case #2 on the first test, an almost total amnesia was reached with the exception of the last ten or twelve minutes of interrogation under the hypnotic technique. In the opinion of [redacted] and as far as the writer was able to determine, a total amnesia was produced at the end of the test on the second day after the Artichoke treatment of sodium pentothal and Desoxyn (full medication without hypnosis).

10. Again in so far as the disposal of Case #2 was concerned (which was not a problem of the Artichoke Team), disposition was apparently to be made as follows: It had been decided that the subject would be moved as a prisoner to some place [redacted] and held there until any possible usefulness to anyone had completely disappeared.

11. As noted above, both of the subjects were [redacted] speaking only and neither subject had any working knowledge of the English language. This, of course, involved the use of an interpreter and, in both cases, [redacted], the case officer involved in Case #1, acted as a general interpreter and [redacted] acted as the specific interpreter in the application of the hypnotic technique (under the direct guidance of [redacted] in hypnotic matters) and also acted as general interpreter in both cases.

12. Concerning the special technical problems involved, the problems were similar to those encountered on other trips of Artichoke teams. In the first place, the field offices are not fully equipped technically. They are lacking in both quality and quantity of equipment and, in the opinion of the writer and [redacted] who handles the technical matters for the Artichoke Team, the men using the technical equipment are not generally trained in technical problems. In those cases, to enable the Artichoke team to secure adequate records and full coverage, the Artichoke Team sent via air freight sufficient technical apparatus to handle this operation, but owing to the unfortunate circumstances of the oil strike coupled with apparently slow administrative handling of the crates carrying the Artichoke technical equipment, this equipment did not arrive until the Team was operating on the second case. Even at that, the peculiar [redacted] made the technical problems difficult. In this connection, [redacted] used every conceivable substitute and device he could arrange and was able to maintain good tape recordings throughout the entire two cases with the exception of one hour during which there [redacted]. For matter of record, it should be noted, and this will be covered in detail in the full technical report, the technical arrangements for securing a tape of all that was said and for furnishing an intercom system between team members and the subject were quite complex, particularly so on the second day of the second case. In general, and for this record, it should be noted that, at all times, three or four microphones were recording the interrogation and at least one direct intercom was in operation by the concealed members of the Artichoke Team and members working in the presence of the subjects.

1. As mentioned above, Case #1 was an individual between thirty and forty years of age, in good health, and a fairly robust physical type. [redacted — several lines redacted under B/3 and A exemptions]

Subject, in connection with [redacted] and in connection with his background, had given numerous conflicting stories, was generally regarded as irresponsible and unreliable, and it was decided to apply the Artichoke technique to him to enable the case officers handling the subject to make a final assessment as to whether or not he had any value to Agency operations and to ascertain, if possible, to what extent [redacted]. Subject spoke basically [redacted] and allegedly had some knowledge [redacted] but apparently had no knowledge of the English language whatsoever. Prior to the application of the Artichoke technique, the subject had been [redacted].

He was regarded by case officers as a very tough, irresponsible individual, capable of wild, unpremeditated activity and entirely capable of suicide. He was known to be, if not a drunkard, an individual who very much liked to drink and get drunk and had an exceeding fondness for women and was given to bragging about his numerous conquests.

2. On Saturday, 6 June 1952, the subject was picked up [redacted] and several guards, his eyes were taped and he was given dark glasses to prevent any suspicions on the part of the local population in the small towns he would be driven through and was driven to the safe house [redacted] and the guards in an inconspicuous black sedan. The party arrived about midday, Saturday, 6 June 1952, and after an hour or thereabouts to give the subject a chance to settle down and after [redacted] had talked with the subject in general, [redacted] began giving the subject the physical and psychiatric tests the team had agreed on as sound cover for these operations. These tests, which included the taking of blood and urine, lasted a considerable length of time, actually including two long sessions of several hours each and consumed most of the remainder of the day [redacted] acted as interpreter during these medical-psychiatric sessions.

3. On Sunday, 7 June 1952, in the morning and in the early afternoon, [redacted] and [redacted] continued the physical and psychiatric examinations and [redacted] included a complete Rorschach test at this time. In addition, [redacted], who had been thoroughly briefed on the case by [redacted] and who had studied the case files and who spoke [redacted], was introduced to the subject as [redacted] and wore [redacted] and wore a listening device in one car which was to be later used in the intercom system when actual testing began. [redacted] explained that [redacted], who was, of course, introduced under a fictitious name as a doctor, was another consultant and it was agreed that certain medical injections were needed in the case to bring the subject's health up to normal. Subject apparently at all times was agreeable to all types of testing and co-operated willingly with the doctors. It was obvious at this point that the [redacted] had succeeded in gaining the subject's confidence and respect and establishing a remarkable screen for the Artichoke work.

4. At 6:30 PM, Sunday, 7 June 1952 (before dinner), the team, having agreed on a "dry" run, made the first attempt in obtaining the narco-hypnosis. [redacted] directed this operation by observing the subject through an opening in one of the doors to the room and having direct communication with [redacted] through the previously mentioned earphone. [redacted] speaking [redacted] carried out the role of hypnotist and a deep hypnotic trance was obtained in about twenty minutes. It should be explained (see medical report) that immediately prior to the induction of hypnosis, [redacted] began injecting in an arm vein of the subject a very light dosage of sodium pentothal in sterilized water. The hypnosis was then coupled to the effects of sodium pentothal by [redacted] and after approximately 5 cc of the solution had been induced into the subject's veins, the rest of the induction was carried out by hypnosis alone. As mentioned before, this was a "dry" run and by previous agreement, no pertinent questions were asked and only tests were made to determine whether hypnosis had been obtained and to what depth the subject had been driven. The results of the "dry" run were entirely successful. The medical handling was perfect and the hypnotic results were excellent in that a deep trance state was reached after about twenty minutes of induction. Several standard hypnotic tests were made during the time the subject was under the effects of hypnosis to determine the depth of the trance and all of those tests proved successful (arm drop, leg drop, speech test, etc.). The subject was awakened by [redacted] under [redacted] directions after strong post-hypnotic suggestions had been given regarding the production of a quick trance state when called upon on the following day. This particular "dry" run lasted approximately one hour from about 6:30 PM to 7:30 PM.

5. On Monday, 8 June 1952, [redacted] continued the medical testing during the day and at approximately 7:00 PM, the second test with actual interrogation was begun. On this test, an even [redacted] partial or fragmentary amnesia for the last fifteen to twenty minutes of the test. Fortunately, the most pertinent questions had all been asked during the first hour and subject's partial knowledge of later questions was not regarded as important. While it is difficult to accurately state why the subject awakened near the conclusion of the interrogation, it was the professional opinion of [redacted] agreed in [redacted] and [redacted] that:

A. An hypnotic trance as a basis for interrogation should not exceed one hour — beyond that, the subject has a tendency to awaken in spite of continuous and skillful reinforcement of the hypnotic suggestions.

B. Any question may be dangerous to ask and if the question is not properly phrased or is personally repugnant to the subject, the subject may awaken or fail to respond.

C. Depth of an hypnotic trance gradually lessens as time goes on and when the subject is constantly being questioned — no matter how skillfully — full control cannot always be maintained.

Subject at this point was fully awakened by [redacted] using a standard, slow hypnotic awakening procedure.

6. Following conclusion of this test, a general conference was held by all hands to discuss results of this test and whether or not additional information from this subject would be desirable. After a discussion, it was decided that on the following day, another Artichoke technique would be applied to the subject and additional information would be sought along lines that would be of additional value to [redacted], the case officer. It was also decided that the test would be made holding the combined medical-hypnotic approach as used in the first case in reserve and attacking the subject on this test with full medication.

7. [Day 3 — Case 1, full medication test] On Monday, 16 June 1952, at approximately 11:30 AM, the subject was prepared for another full test. At this time, there were present in the room [redacted] and [redacted] with [redacted] and [redacted] to act as interpreters and interrogators. In this connection, [redacted] had rigged a complex intercommunication system which permitted [redacted] to be in a position to communicate with the interpreters and at the same time hear the results of the interrogation as it went along. No hypnotic approach was made during this test.

8. At approximately 12:00 noon, [redacted] began the administration of heavy dosages of sodium pentothal intravenously and shortly thereafter the subject began to react to the drugs. After a state of drowsiness had been reached and before a full coma had developed, the [redacted] began a physical stimulation of the subject in order to place the subject in the so-called "twilight state" which is the best condition for interrogation. This physical stimulation consisted of shaking the subject, putting pressure on certain nerves, and sharply slapping the subject's feet. Thereafter, from about 12:15 to 12:45 PM, some interrogation was carried on [redacted] and during this period the interrogation was not taken on recording tapes.

9. At approximately 1:00 PM, it was decided by the [redacted] to begin injection of a stimulant to see if a more expansive, talkative reaction could be obtained from the subject. Accordingly, [redacted] began a carefully controlled injection through the intravenous apparatus of dosages of Desoxyn (d-desoxynephedrine hydrochloride — stimulant which produces elevation of mood, talkativeness, etc.). After a short period of time, this combination began to have a highly successful effect. The subject began to be more talkative, more dramatic, and apparently a great deal less inhibited than previously. The drugs produced, during this period, in addition to a great deal of talk, a remarkable regression and during this regression the subject actually relived certain past activities of his life, some dating back fifteen years, while in addition, the subject totally accepted [redacted] (who was acting as one of the interpreters at this time) as an old trusted, beloved personal friend whom the subject had known in years past [redacted]. This regression, at times, became extremely vivid and produced dramatic feelings and statements on the part of the subject to such an extent that he insisted from time to time upon kissing [redacted] whom he continuously called by the name of his old friend and former associate.

10. The total time consumed (about two and one-half hours) under the influence of the chemicals counting from the starting time of the injection, was from approximately 12:00 noon until about 2:38 PM, when the subject was removed to his own adjoining bedroom. The total effective interrogation time during this period (including the regression) was from about 12:15 PM until 2:10 PM.

11. The time from 2:10 PM to 2:38 PM was consumed by the subject partially recovering from the effects of the dosages of the drugs. During this period, the subject was groggy, somewhat nauseated, was primarily in a semi-conscious state and was, for a considerable period of time, unresponsive to muscular co-ordination tests. When the subject was removed from the operations room to his own bedroom at 2:38 PM, he required assistance and was staggering on his feet and after being placed in his bed he passed into a sleep which lasted for several hours.

12. Shortly after the conclusion of this last test, a general conference was held by all hands between 3:00 and 4:00 PM and it was decided that on the basis of the material obtained, the Artichoke work would be considered as completed. [redacted] stated that he had obtained ample information to continue the work on the case and he felt that he might possibly in the future, on the basis of the new information developed, run the subject again on the polygraph on new material and the new discrepancies that had appeared as a result of the Artichoke treatment. [redacted] emphatically expressed himself that, on the basis of the material uncovered, the subject was totally unreliable and in the future his disposition would have to be a controlled matter, which [redacted] stated had been agreed upon previously.

13. As noted above, both cases were entirely recorded with the exception of one period [redacted]. The tape recordings were turned over to the case officers involved to enable them to study them and draft from the recordings all notes, comments, etc. which they needed to complete their work. It should again be noted that the responses of the subjects are, of course, [redacted] and have not to date been interpreted or transcribed in English to enable the ARTICHOKE Team to study the results of the application of the techniques. As far as is known, the tapes are being held [redacted] and will be, after full use had been made of them in the area, forwarded to Washington, D.C. It is believed that [redacted] will handle this matter as soon as possible, although to date we have received no report in this connection.

In the opinion of the Artichoke Team members, the successful application of a combined hypnotic-chemical approach indicates that these techniques worked in combination have a very high potential as an intelligence weapon.

The Artichoke Team feels that since these techniques have only been used in a limited sense, it would be wrong to make extensive claims for the efficacy of the techniques, but it does appear to be clearly established that these techniques, when properly applied and given a careful cover screen, should be generally highly effective.

The Team members feel that the most important element that is necessary to perfect these techniques is the application of the techniques to a great number of cases. The Team members also feel that if work can be done in many cases, it will be possible to refine the techniques, make the results more certain, reduce the time requirements for the administration of the techniques, and settle more specifically on the technical details involved. Additional cases will also give the Artichoke Team a chance to test new chemicals, new combinations, and new ideas in both the psychological and hypnotic fields.

It is the general conclusion of the Team members that the Artichoke technique is financially worthwhile and that in view of the small success to date, additional funds can be given to this project with the strong assurance that the money will not be wasted.

1. At the present time, there is an absence of technical equipment both in quantity and quality in the field stations and it should be a rule of the Artichoke Team when traveling to take with them or ship to the point at which the Artichoke work is to be done, all the necessary technical equipment required. This equipment, upon completion of the Artichoke work, should be turned over to the field stations for their later use.

2. Insofar as possible, technical equipment to be used in the Artichoke work or for that matter in technical work overseas should be modified in the United States to suit overseas conditions before it is shipped.

3. If the Artichoke work is to be expanded, it is essential that interrogators be found who have wide [redacted] language ability. If individuals are to be trained to assist in the Artichoke work, a preference should be given to those individuals having a fluent knowledge of [redacted] languages.

4. The development of a medical-psychiatric cover as carried out by the instant operation is regarded by the Team as excellent cover. Any [redacted] working in the field with the Artichoke Team, if at all possible, should have the benefit of consultation with [redacted].

5. Since [redacted] electrical power at best is an uncertain quantity, the development of mechanically powered and battery-operated recording equipment should be pressed. The Technical Research Staff is at present working on this type of equipment and will, as soon as it has reached the operational stage, make recommendations that this type of equipment be forwarded to the various [redacted]. It is particularly essential that this type of equipment be held in readiness as a standby in the event of power failures.

6. It is urgently recommended that, in the future, as Artichoke operations are contemplated (particularly on a larger scale), the technical equipment with the Artichoke technician and a designated I&SO Staff Officer be sent to the operation area in advance to lay on technical and administrative details that are essential prior to the departure of the Artichoke Team. In larger operations, that would be a tremendous factor in increasing the technical and operating efficiency of the Artichoke work.

1. The Artichoke Team felt that the security handling of this operation was excellent. The security arrangements, which were handled by the office of [redacted] were under the personal direction of [redacted] and were outstanding in every respect. Credit is also due to [redacted] who in addition to handling the security problems, covered most of the administrative details and the personal details involved in this operation.

2. The case officers [redacted], who enacted the difficult role of interpreter-hypnotist, carried out their work in an unusually intelligent and co-operative manner.

3. The medical-psychiatric work, which was so vital to the operation, was handled by [redacted] and [redacted] of the [redacted]. Without their highly competent assistance, the Artichoke work would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible.

4. The technical arrangements, which were very complex and included multiple intercommunication systems, were handled in a highly efficient manner by [redacted] of the [redacted]. Work again demonstrates that all operations of this type require the highest technical skill with particularly the ability to improvise as an absolute essential.

5. Without in any sense being critical, two comments are herewith added for consideration in future operations: A. Long experience and constant practice are essential elements in the makeup of an interrogator working with the Artichoke techniques. This, of course, implies fluent knowledge of the native language of the subject. Sharp, intelligent, and sound interrogation techniques are vital in Artichoke operations. B. If at all possible in future operations, the safe house for the operation should be closer to the [redacted] headquarters than in the operation just concluded. The writer, of course, recognizes that this is a difficult security problem, but as a means of increased efficiency, speed, etc., safe houses near headquarters are most desirable. In this connection, the writer wishes to make one observation which conceivably would be of value in these operations and that is that the overseas offices of the Agency should have as a standard piece of equipment a windowless ambulance or delivery truck or inconspicuous closed motor vehicle of some type wherein the subject could be transported without the inherent danger of observation either from the outside or by subjects themselves. Furthermore, it is believed this would eliminate some of the problems of the guards in the handling of the subjects.